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ARE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HIRES




In this paper we use micro-level data on employers and employees to investigate whether
Affirmative Action procedures lead firms to hire minority or female employees who are less
qualified than workers who might otherwise be hired. Our measures of qualifications include the
educational attainment of the workers hired (both absolutely and relative to job requirements),
skill requirements of the job into which they are hired, and a variety of outcome measures that
are presumably related to worker performance on the job. The analysis is based on a
representative sample of over 3,200 employers in four major metropolitan areas in the U.S. Our
results show some evidence of lower educational qualifications among blacks and Hispanics hired
under Affirmative Action, but not among white women. Further, our results show little evidence
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and NBERI. Introduction
Affirmative Action policies have always been controversial, largely because of the allegation
that they cause employers (and universities) to prefer less-qualified minorities or females over more-
qualified white males. Smvey evidence suggests that, even among whites, there is widespread public
support for outlawing employment discrimination and also for policies that compensate the past
victims of discrimination through targeted education, job training, and recruitment efforts. At the
same time, policies that give “preference” in employment or university admissions to less-qualified
members of these groups are strongly opposed (e.g., Lipset and Schneider, 1978; Bobo and Smith,
1994).’
Similarly, many critics of Affirmative Action policies support strong enforcement of EEO
laws and even compensatory recruitment and training, but argue that the alleged preferences for less-
qualified minorities and females in most current Affirmative Action practices create labor market
inefficiencies and/or inequities.2 In contrast, proponents of Affirmative Action policies frequently
argue that labor market discrimination continues to be prevalent, despite EEO laws.3 They also argue
that gaps in the relative qualifications of different groups (when measured by educational attainment,
‘In these data, much hinges on the wording of questions describing Affirmative Action; references to “quotas” or
“reverse discrimination” generally elicit the most negative responses. There is also some evidence of more tolerance for
compensatory policies in education than in employment, though quotas or other forms of preferences in university
admissions are still widely opposed. For a view that distinguishes Affirmative Action in universities from that in
employment see Carter (199 1).
‘Critics of current Affirmative Action policies that stress both inefficiencies and inequities (from violating principles
of rewards based on individual merit) include Glazer (1975), Epstein (1992) and Sowell (1990). Coate and Loury (1993)
argue that Affirmative Action can reduce the incentives of “prefemed” groups to invest in human capital formation, while
Carter (199 1) also emphasizes the stigma borne by qualified minorities because of these policies.
3Evidence of discrimination against minorities or females, even when controlling for observable credentials, can be
found in several recent “audit” studies of employers (e.g., Fix and Struyk, 1994; Neumark, forthcoming), in which
matched pairs of applicants with comparable credentials but differing race/gender are sent out to apply for specific jobs.
1experience, etc.) likely reflect past or current discrimination,4 and that such qualifications are weak
predictors of actual performance on the job (which itself maybe difficult to measure, especially in the
short term).5 In this view, the efficiency costs of preferential policies are considered very small or
even negative (since these policies might actually lead to the hiring of more productive minorities and
females).
The current debate on Affirmative Action thus turns heavily on the existence and empirical
magnitudes of shortfalls in qualifications and job performance of women and minorities hired under
Affirmative Action. Yet, despite the intensity of the viewpoints held, the evidence to date on this
issue remains quite thin. To the best of our knowledge, the only systematic empirical study of the
effects of Affirmative Action on productivity in employment is that of Jonathan Leonard (1984).6 He
estimates production functions using state-by-two-digit industry data in manufacturing, in which the
fractions of employment accounted for by minorities/females and by federal contractors (who are
typically required to have Affirmative Action plans) appear as independent variables. But the
usefulness of this approach is limited by the highly aggregated nature of the data and its focus only on
manufacturing. 7 Also, Badgett (1995) provides more qualitative evidence on the effects of
Affirmative Action on the qualifications of minority hires from a case study of a large manufacturing
4For instance, Bergmann (1989) stresses that occupation-specific experience requirements effectively discriminate
against women who have been barred from gaining such experience because of occupational segregation by gender.
‘The difficulty of predicting or observing individual-level productivity has been stressed in the “statistical
discrimination” literature (e.g., Cain, 1986), and more recently byOettinger(1996) and Altonji and Pierret (1996). The
question of whether required qualifications accurately predict job performance, and whether any resulting “disparate
impacts” across demographic groups can be considered discrimination, has been addressed in a variety of court cases
(e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power in 1971 and Ward Cove v. Atonio in 1989) and in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The debate
over the latter, including the allegations of critics that such legislation constituted a “quota bill, ” indicates the difficulties
of distinguishing strong EEO policies from preferential treatment.
cMost of Leonard’s papers deal with the effects of Affirmative Action on relative employment, occupational status,
and the like. These are reviewed in various survey papers (1989, 1990).
‘Given the small effects of Affirmative Action on the overall composition of employment that Leonard shows in his
other work, it is very unlikely that he would find strong effects on productivity at the two-digit indust~ level.
2firm, and concludes that – at this company – Affirmative Action did not result in lower-quality hires,
based in part on evidence that upper-level management promoted Affirmative Action as a means of
finding the best employees.s
In this paper, we provide what we believe to be the first micro-level empirical evidence on the
relative qualifications of workers hired under Affirmative Action. Using data on new hires collected
from employers, we are able to compare the qualifications of women or minorities hired under
Affirmative Action to those of white men in comparable jobs, and to those of women or minorities
hired in firms that do not use Affirmative Action. Of course, workers’ qualifications and
performance are difficult to measure. We therefore take a broad-ranging approach, focusing on a
wide variety of variables related to both initial qualifications as well as performance on the job.
II. The Data
The Sam~le
The data are drawn from a survey that was administered
metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles.9
between June of 1992 and May of 1994, as the national economy was recovering from the recession
of the early 1990s.10
to 800 employers in each of four
The survey was administered
‘Regarding college admissions, Loury and Garman (1995) and Kane (1995) present evidence of gaps in SAT scores
between white and black college students, to infer the effects of Affirmative Action on college admissions. The former
study suggests that preferential admissions policies lead blacks with low test scores to attend (and frequently drop out
from) colleges with higher average test scores. The latter suggests that these results mostly reflect differences in high-
school performance and family background rather than preferential admissions for blacks.
‘The survey is part of a broader project known as the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, that consists of household
surveys and an in-depth, qualitative study of a smaller sample of employers in each of these four metropolitan areas, The
project has been financed by the Ford and Russell Sage Foundations (Holzer, 1996a). These data are also used in Holzer
(1995 and 1996b).
‘“The survey was administered to firms in Detroit between June 1992 and February 1993; it was administered in the
other areas between March 1993 and May 1994. The timing was deliberately chosen in order to coordinate with the
3Thesmey wasadministered overthe phone, andaveraged roughly 35minutesin1ength. The
sample of firms was drawn from two sources: 1) a listing of firms and their phone numbers provided
by Survey Sampling, Inc. (SS1); and 2) the employers of respondents in the household surveys that
were also administered in each of these four metropolitan areas. 1‘ The latter were drawn in order to
generate a sample of “matched pairs” of individuals and employers. For the firms in the SS1 part of
the sample, the respondent to the survey is the person who is responsible for hiring non-college
workers. For the sample drawn from the household survey, the respondent is the person responsible
for hiring into the occupation of the household respondent.’2
A number of steps were taken to ensure that the data could be used to draw inferences
regarding the underlying population. Sample weights were generated to account for any differences
in firm characteristics that might be attributable to these different sampling strategies, so that we can
pool data from these two sources. Despite the differences between these two sources, both were
designed to generate employee-weighted samples of firms. For the SS1 sample, this was
accomplished by ex ante stratification of the sample based on establishment size, with the distribution
of firms chosen to approximate the distribution of employees across size categories in the
workforce. 13 For the household-generated sample, the distribution of firms should approximate the
surveying of households in each area, as part of the Multi-City study described above. Monthly unemployment rates
averaged under six percent in Atlanta and Boston during the survey period; in Detroit and Los Angeles they averaged
roughly eight percent and under ten percent respectively during the relevant periods. Dummy variables for metropolitan
area and year of survey are included in the multivariate analyses that follow to control for these differences in local labor
market conditions.
]‘The SS1 listings are drawn primarily from local phone directories that are supplemented by other sources. For
another example of employer data drawn from SS1 listings, see Barren, et al. (1994).
‘zMost characteristics of workers and jobs do not differ significantly across the samplesof firms generated by the two
data sources.
“The stratification scheme was: 25 percent in establishments with fewer than 20 employees; 50 percent in
establishments with 20-99 employees; and 25 percent in those with 100 or more employees. These distributions were
drawn from a weighted sample of firms in the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) of 1980 and 1982.distribution of employment in the population by construction (at least when sample-weighted). Thus,
no additional size-weighting of firms is necessary with this sample. 14When focusing on the
characteristics of each firm’s most recently-filled job, the sample will provide extra weight to firms
that do a lot of hiring because of their size (but not because of high turnover).] 5 The sample of new
jobs should thus reasonably approximate the available stock of jobs.
The overall response rate for the survey was roughly 67 percent for firms that were
successfully screened. 16This response rate compares quite favorably with other surveys of emplo yers
administered over the phone (e.g., Kling, 1995). In addition, because we have some measured
characteristics of firms in the SS1 sample that did not respond to the survey (i.e., establishment size,
industry, and location), we could check for differences in response rates across these observable
categories that might generate sample selection bias. Few significant differences were found in
response rates across the categories measured by these variables. 17
Comparisons of the industries and sizes of firms in our sample were also made with firms in
the most recently available published data from County Business Patterns for these metropolitan
areas, and the two samples appeared to be quite comparable.’8 Finally, we compared the distribution
“Sample weights are applied to the household-generated firms that adjust for: 1) the underrepresentation of jobs
requiring college, since the SS1 sample focused on non-college jobs; 2) the oversampling of low-income and minority
residents in the household surveys; and 3) the incompleteness of the Boston and Los Angeles samples of households from
which employers were drawn. More information on the construction of these weights is available from the authors.
‘5 The lack of extra weighting for high-turnover firms seems appropriate, since a single job that tams over frequently is
only available to a single worker at any time. Unfortunately, there was no easy way to put extra weight on firms whose
rate of hiring is temporarily high due to their net employment growth,
lcSuccessfillY screened fires were those where the correct firm and the person responsible for new hiring into the
relevant types of positions were contacted, and where the firm had hired someone in the past three years into one of those
positions.
17 For more details see Holzer (1996a). Only response rates among firms in cOnstrUctiOn andinthe smallestsize
category were significantly lower than others, while those in the public sector and the largest establishments were
significantly higher. But response rates were within .10 of the mean (.67) in all of these categories.
‘aThe published data show that jobs in retail trade, the services, and manufacturing account for .17-.21, .31-.40, and
5of occupations among our most recently-filled jobs with that in the 1990 Census of Population for
these areas, and with the distributions of occupations and worker characteristics among all employees
in our firms, to see whether or not the sample of “marginal” employees (i.e., new hires) differs greatly
from the “average.” We found only minor evidence of this.19
Variables Used in the Study
The variables used in this study are primarily drawn from survey questions on the last job
filled and the worker hired into that job, In particular, respondents were asked whether or not
“Affirmative Action or Equal Opportunity Law play any role in your recruiting activities for this
position,” and also whether or not these factors play any role in terms of who is hired. The measure
we use for Affirmative Action in this paper is the latter.20
Given the wording of the question, there may some ambiguity over whether we are picking up
the effects of Affirmative Action or EEO law more generally, However, the evidence suggests that
while EEO law technically refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, companies interpret this
question to mean Affirmative Action. All firms with 15 or more employees are bound by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, and hence, by Equal Employment Opportunity law;2] in contrast, a smaller
subset of firms have Affirmative Action plans. Because only 45 percent of our firms (on an
employee-weighted basis) report any role for Affirmative Action or EEO law in hiring, we assume
that respondents were generally indicating whether the firm used an explicit Affirmative Action
.13-,24 of total employment in these areas. The distribution of employment across industries in the survey is very
comparable to these figures,
l~For instmce, the new hires conta~ fewer white males (.26 VS..32), more blacks, (.20 vs. .17), and more blue-collar
workers (.35 vs. ,26) than do all current employees,
ZIILowerqualifications or performance are more likely when Affirmative Action is used in hiring rather than in
recruiting. In addition, data on Affirmative Action in hiring are obviously more pertinent to who actually gets hired,
which is the focus of the policy debate.
2’Bloch (1994) estimates that under 20 percent of the private sector workforce is not covered by Title VII.
6policy. Even this, however, is ambiguous, since Title VII instructs courts to “order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include .. reinstatement or hiring of employees ...“ when
employers are found guilty of discrimination.
However, we believe that we are generally measuring Affirmative Action plans as prescribed
by Executive Order 11246 or voluntary plans adopted by employers .22 Although our self-reported
measure is not based directly on federal contractor status, as was Leonard’s, the fraction of
establishments reporting using Affirmative Action, and their characteristics, are similar in our sample
and Leonard’s, suggesting that our classification scheme does not differ greatly from his. In
particular, roughly 60 percent of the establishments used by Leonard are classified as federal
contractors, in a sample drawn from filers of EEO- 1 forms (which represents all establishments above
100 employees, all over 50 with federal contracts, and all over 25 in multi-establishment firms) .23 In
our size-weighted sample of establishments, 60 percent report some use of Affirmative Action/EEO
in recruiting or hiring. Use of Affirmative Action is highly correlated with establishment size in both
samples.
Thus, the classification of firms by Affirmative Action status in our data displays similar
patterns to the classification based on federal contractor status in Leonard’s data. The correspondence
on a firm-by-firm basis is undoubtedly imperfect. It is not obvious, though, that self-reported
Affirmative Action status is an inferior measure. Given that there is imperfect compliance with
Affirmative Action guidelines for federal contractors (as emphasized, e.g., by Leonard, 1989), and
*zAffirmative Action may be implemented for one of three main reasons. First, it is mandatory for firms with federal
contracts with 50 or more employees or a contract worth $50,000 or more (Leonard, 1989). Second, it may be
implemented by the courts as a remedy for a finding of past discrimination (see the discussion in Epstein, 1991, Ch, 19).
Third, Affirmative Action hiring may be used as a deterrent to claims of discrimination under Title VII (see the case
study discussed in Badgett, 1995, p, 493), or to increase workplace diversity for other reasons. Voluntary Affirmative
Action plans are permitted if they are based on specific plan, correct a previous imbalance, protect the interests of non-
Affirmative Action candidates, and will end when specific goals are met (Gold, 1993).
“Beginning in 1983, only the first two types of establishments had to file (Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996).
7given that non-contractors can have Affirmative Action plans, a measure of Affirmative Action use
based on what firms perceive themselves to be doing may in fact be preferable to, or at least as good
as, a measure based on federal contractor status .24
The other job-specific questions include whether or not a college degree is required for the
job; whether or not high school, specific previous experience, vocational training, or references are
each required;25 whether each of a set of tasks (dealing with customers directly, reading or writing
paragraphs, arithmetic, or computer use) is performed daily on the job; and a set of one-digit
occupational dummies. The characteristics of the last worker hired include race/ethnicity, sex, age,
and educational attainment. Firm-specific characteristics include establishment size, percent of
workforce covered by collective bargaining, one-digit industry dummy variables, and dummy
variables for location within the central city of the MSA. We also use variables for the race and
gender of the respondent to the survey, and the racial composition of the firm’s customer pool, to
control as much as possible for determinants of racial or gender preferences among survey
respondents.
III. Descriptive Information on Hiring in Firms by Use of Affirmative Action
Descri~tive Statistics
We begin in Table 1 by providing simple descriptive information on differences between
worker-fire matches in which Affirmative Action is used in hiring and those in which it is not. In
subsequent tables we turn to the differences between minorities and white females who are hired into
24BeCaUSe the SurveY usedinthispaperwas not designed explicitly to study Affirmative Action, the surveY did not
elicit information that might firther clarify the interpretation of the question.
Zswe code most of these requirements as dummy variables which take on a value of one if the requirement’s
“absolutely necessary” or “strongly preferred” at the time of hiring and zero if it is “mildly preferred” or “doesn’t matter. ”
In contrast, the college requirement is based on an explicit “yes” or “no” question in the survey.
8firms that use Affirmative Action, relative to other groups of workers.
Looking first at demographic characteristics of recent hires, we see that the largest absolute
difference between hires based on Affirmative Action and those that are not is between white males
and females, where the proportion of recent hires accounted for by these groups is .06 lower and .07
higher, respectively, when Affirmative Action is used in hiring. The proportions of recent hires
among the other demographic groups are not very different between Affirmative Action and non-
Affirmative Action hiring; the proportions of black females and Hispanic males are actually slightly
lower. Of course, these are univariate comparisons, and the influence of Affirmative Action on hiring
by demographic group may change once account is taken of firm, job, and other individual
characteristics.2G
The second panel of Table 1 provides information on worker education, while the third panel
provides descriptive information on job requirements for the jobs into which the recent hiring
occurred. We see that workers hired under Affirmative Action tend to be more educated, and that
skill requirements are higher for these jobs for each of the requirements listed in the table. These
results suggest that we may have to compare qualifications of women and minorities relative to white
males within the subset of firms using Affirmative Action; otherwise, we might incorrectly conclude
that Affirmative Action hires are more qualified. This issue receives considerable attention in the
empirical analysis.
Consistent with the above results, the fourth panel in Table 1 reveals that a greater proportion
of hiring in firms using Affirmative Action is into management/professional and clerical jobs than
“These results also differ somewhat from those of Leonard (1989) for the 1970’s, who finds proportionately bigger
effects on black males and females than on white females. But during the 1980’s Leonard finds relative employment of
black males and females declining at contractor establishments (relative to non-contractors), which is consistent with the
findings reported here and in Table 2. The results are partly consistent with those reported by Rodgers and Spriggs
(1996), who find that federal contractor status is associated with a higher percentage of black workers (by 12 percent) and
a lower percentage of Hispanic workers (by 0,45 percent) in 1992.
9into blue-collar or service jobs.27 Of course, these results do not indicate whether Affirmative Action
hiring is used more for such occupations, or whether Affirmative Action leads to more hiring into
such occupations, or to the appearance thereof via title inflation (Smith and Welch, 1984). Given
these questions, it is unclear whether it is always appropriate to control for occupation (or required
skills), which generates only within-j ob estimates of Affirmative Action effects.
The fifth panel of Table 1 provides descriptive information on firm characteristics, broken
down by whether or not Affirmative Action was used in recent hiring. Firms using Affirmative
Action are much larger, have a significantly higher proportion of the workforce covered by collective
bargaining, and are significantly more likely to be in the services industry. These firms also have
higher percentages of black and Hispanic customers.
Finally, the sixth panel of Table 1 reports on the demographic characteristics of supervisors
and respondents to the survey. We see that respondents – who are responsible for hiring – are more
likely to be the opposite sex from the new hire in firms that report using Affirmative Action in hiring,
although this is not true of supervisors. In the multivariate analyses that follow, we ask whether these
characteristics of respondents or supervisors have any bearing on the results for outcomes over which
respondents or supervisors exert some control – such as promotions and performance ratings.
The Effects of Affirmative Action on Hiring of Women and Minorities
Table 2 presents a multivariate descriptive analysis of the relationship between Affirmative
Action hiring and the demographic group of the recent hire, based on logit or multinominal logit
estimates of the association between Affirmative Action hiring and the demographic group of the
recent hire, accounting – in different specifications – for differences in firm characteristics, in the
ZT~is evidence is broadly consistent with Leonard’s (1989) findings that Affirmative Action has created the most
opporhmities for white women in white-collar trainee positions, and for black females in managerial, sales, clerical,
laborer, and white-collar trainee positions.
1028 In each column, we report the estimated occupational distribution of hires, and in job requirements.
effects of Affirmative Action hiring on the probability that the hire was in the demographic group
listed in the left-hand column, relative to the probability that the hire was in the omitted demographic
group (i.e., the logit or multinominal logit coefficient estimates). The marginal effects on the
probabilities are reported in square brackets.
We first look at aggregated demographic groups, Columns (1) and (1’) report estimates for
the probability that the recent hire was a minority or white female. In column(1), controls for city
and year of hire, as well as firm characteristics (listed in Table 1) are included. The probability that a
minority or female was hired is estimated to be significantly higher, by .03, when Affirmative Action
is used in hiring. 29 Column (1‘)adds controls for the occupations and job requirements listed in Table
1. Probably in part because Affirmative Action is used relatively more in occupations into which
women are more likely to be hired, the association between Affirmative Action and hiring of
minorities or females weakens slightly when we include these controls.
Columns (2) and (2’) repeat estimates with the same control variables, but report estimates of
multinominal logit models for the probability of a hire in each of the demographic groups identified in
the data. The estimates in column (2’) indicate that the probabilities that white females and black
males are hired, relative to the probability that a white male is hired, are significantly higher when
Affirmative Action is used in hiring; the hiring of black and Hispanic females appears to be
Z51nthis table and all that follow, estimates are sample-weighted (as they were in Table 1). This has some bearing ‘n
the estimates because the effects are somewhat different for college educated and high-school educated workers, and the
latter are overrepresented in the sample. Thus, the sample weighting produces more accurate “average” effects.
29’’Minority or female” refers to white women, blacks, and Hispanics. All of the models estimated in the paper also
included categories for Asian men and women. However, we do not focus on (or report) results for Asians, since most of
the debate seems to be about the treatment of relatively disadvantaged subgroups of the population, a categorization
which may not apply to Asians.
11unaffected.30 Comparing effects on probabilities to the means in Table 1 for each group, we see that
Affirmative Action is associated with an increase of about ten percent (not ten percentage points) in
the probability of hiring white women, and an increase of about 20 percent in the probability of hiring
black men. Finally, the last row indicates that the probability that a white male is hired is lower by
about 15-20 percent under Affirmative Action.31 Presumably, most of these white males are then
hired in firms not using Affirmative Action; these firms likely pay less, among other reasons because
they are smaller.32
These results, coupled with evidence of strengthened enforcement activity in 1989 and
especially in 1993 (Anderson, 1996), suggest that Affirmative Action has real consequences for firm
hiring behavior. We next turn to the more contentious issue of the relative qualifications and
performance of women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action.
IV. Relative Qualifications and Performance of Affirmative Action Hires
Having documented the associations between Affirmative Action and hiring of minorities and
women, we now turn to the central question of this paper – whether Affirmative Action leads to the
hiring of less-qualified women or minorities. Our general approach is to let Q be a measure of the
qualifications or performance of the last worker hired, and to estimate equations of the form:
(1) Qijk= ~wMijk -(1 - AAjk) + ~Dijk.AAjk+ yWMijk.AAjk + 5Dijk.(1 - AAjk) + Oxj + Azk’ + ~ijk,
‘“See footnote 26,
31 We divide 0.05 or 0.06 by the average proportion of white males in non-Affirmative Action firms in Table 1. Note
that in columns (1) and (1‘), the marginal effects reported form inorities or white females are smaller in absolute value
than those for white males. This is because Asians are also included in the estimation, and their hiring appears to be
boosted more by Affirmative Action.
SZFufiher if there is some job segregation by demographic characteristics, or if overall hiring at fl~s ‘sing
Affirmative Action falls because of the policy, the wages of white males in non-Affirmative Action firms will be lower
because of an outward labor supply shift.
12where AA is a dummy variable indicating that Affirmative Action was used in hiring, D is a vector of
demographic dummy variables for women or minorities, WM is a dummy variable for white males, X
is a vector of job characteristics, and Z a vector of firm characteristics; i, j, and k denote the last
worker hired, the most recent job filled, and the firm, respectively. Note that we include separate
intercepts for each demographic group distinguished by the Affirmative Action status of the firm, and
no common intercept.
This specification provides us with a number of potential comparisons for estimating the
effects of Affirmative Action in hiring. One interesting comparison is between women or minority
hires in firms using Affirmative Action and white male hires in firms using Affirmative Action. The
difference in Q for this comparison is given by (~ – y). A second interesting comparison is between
women or minority hires in firms using Affirmative Action and women or minority hires in firms not
using Affirmative Action, which is captured by the difference (~ – 6). A third comparison is between
women or minority hires in firms using Affirmative Action and white male hires in firms not using
Affirmative Action, which is measured by (~ – u); this comparison may be relevant to those white
male workers who might otherwise have been hired in firms using Affirmative Action had the policy
not been in place.
With respect to the first two comparisons, in particular, there is the potential for misleading
inferences to be drawn. For example, suppose that the estimate of (~ – y) is a large negative number,
indicating that women or minorities hired into firms using Affirmative Action are less qualified than
white males hired into similar firms. However, there may be a similar shortfall in qualifications
between women or minorities and white males in firms not using Affirmative Action; workers in non-
Affirmative Action firms should then serve as a control group to pick up overall differences between
minorities or women and white men. For example, Hispanics may be perceived as less qualified or
13perform less well because of language barriers, regardless of whether the firm into which they are
hired uses Affirmative Action. Continuing with this example, this implies that to estimate the
independent effects of Affirmative Action on differences between white male and Hispanic workers,
we want to subtract off any shortfall in qualifications attributable to language in firms not using
Affirmative Action, and to ask instead whether the shortfall is relatively larger in firms using
Affirmative Action. In general, the shortfall in qualifications (or performance) in firms not using
Affirmative Action is measured by (5 - a), leading to the difference-in-differences estimate of (~ - y)
– (5 - a).33 Thus, critics of Affirmative Action make a potential error if they base their criticisms
only on observed shortfalls in qualifications at firms using Affirmative Action, rather than the net
difference in these shortfalls between the two sectors.
Similarly, if the comparison (~ – 5) indicates that women or minorities hired at firms using
Affirmative Action are less qualified than similar workers hired at firms not using Affirmative
Action, we have to ask whether there is a similar difference in qualifications between white males
hired at firms using Affirmative Action and white males hired at other firms, because of differences
between the two sets of firms that are common to all demographic groups; this leads to the same
difference-in-differences estimator. 34 However, the generally higher skills and qualifications in firms
using Affirmative Action suggests that the difference-in-differences estimator is more relevant to the
comparison between women or minorities and white males at firms using Affirmative Action. Table 3
summarizes the alternative estimates we present.35
3]Note that the difference-in-differences estimator (~ – y) – (6 – u) is equal to the difference between the first and
third comparisons, (~ – y) – (~ – cc),plus the second comparison, (~ – 6), Note also that this estimator does not
distinguish between a larger difference in qualifications in firms using Affirmative Action that arises from lower
standards for women or minorities, or higher standards for white men, relative to firms not using Affirmative Action.
‘“This estimator is (~ – b) - (y - a), which is equal to (~ - y) - (6 - a).
35Arelevant differences-in-differences estimate with respect to the difference (~ – u) is (woman/minority AA hire vs.
white male non-AA hire) – (woman/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire). This estimate corresponds to
14There are three potential econometric problems with estimates of equation(1). First, we
cannot be certain that the differentials associated with Affirmative Action do not reflect unmeasured
job or firm characteristics that differ across firms that use Affirmative Action in hiring and hire
minorities or women, and firms that use Affirmative Action but do not hire minorities or women –
i.e., unobserved characteristics that vary within the subset of firms using Affirmative Action in such a
way as to be correlated with minority or female hiring. But, as noted above, the difference-in-
differences estimator eliminates unobserved differences in job or firm characteristics by race or sex
that are constant across firms that do and do not use Affirmative Action (or differences by
Affirmative Action status that are constant across demographic groups). Without data on multiple
hires for the same job in the same firm, we must simply make the assumption that unobserved job or
firm characteristics are not correlated with the Affirmative Action-demographic group interactions
(D.AA) as well as with qualifications, in order to identifi relative differentials in qualifications
among minorities or women hired under Affirmative Action.
Second, if the decision to use Affirmative Action is endogenous, then D-AA may be
correlated with the error term. If firms with the smallest skill differentials between minorities and
females, on the one hand, and white males, on the other, are most likely to embrace such hiring (since
they may face the lowest costs from using Affirmative Action), our estimates may be biased in the
direction of finding no differences in qualifications, relative to the estimates we would obtain from an
exogenously-impo sed policy (such as requirements on federal contractors). However, the
correspondence between the patterns of reported use of Affirmative Action in our data and in
Leonard’s data (based on contractor status), coupled with the fact that firms in some industries are
the difference (~ – 6). This estimator might correct for lower qualifications or skills overall in firms using Affirmative
Action. However, Table 1 indicates that this is unlikely to be an issue.
15much more likely to be federal contractors than are firms in other industries, suggests that a good part
of the variation in use of Affirmative Action is exogenous. Furthermore, the main goal of this paper
is to evaluate the effects of Affirmative Action as it is used in practice, and not to evaluate the effects
of an exogenously imposed Affirmative Action policy. For this question, the issue of self-selection
into the sample using Affirmative Action is irrelevant. It becomes relevant, however, if we try to
draw conclusions regarding, for example, the effects of eliminating Affirmative Action practices. As
this discussion emphasizes, considerable caution must be exercised in drawing any such conclusions
from our evidence, as the assumptions required to justifi such conclusions may not hold in our data.
Finally, as discussed above, there is some ambiguity in the classification of firms using
Affirmative Action. Though we believe it is small, any misclassification of firms is likely to bias the
results towards finding no impact of Affirmative Action. Since for many demographic groups our
evidence points to no impact, the results must be interpreted cautiously, pending development of
superior data sources to re-examine some of the questions we consider in this paper.
Educational C)ualifications
The qualification we can most easily identifi with workers is their education. Table 4 reports
alternative simple differences and difference-in-differences estimates for years of education of the last
worker hired. The estimates in Panel A are based on specifications that include only city and year
dummy variables and firm characteristics as control variables. The estimates in column(1) measure
(~ - y), the differences between women or minorities and white males hired at firms using
Affirmative Action, For all five groups, the educational level of women or minority Affirmative
Action hires is significantly lower than that of white males hired into similar firms; the differential is
less than one-half year for white females, but about one and one-half years for blacks, and two and
16one-half years for Hispanics. 36 However, the estimates of (~ – u) in column (3) indicate that these
educational shortfalls also appear – although to a lesser extent – between women and minorities hired
in firms using Affirmative Action, and white males hired in firms not using Affirmative Action. At
the same time, the estimates in column (2) indicate that, with the exception of Hispanic males, there
are negligible differences between women and minorities in firms using Affirmative Action and in
firms not using Affirmative Action. The combined evidence implies that the educational shortfalls in
column (1) overstate the shortfalls that can be attributed to Affirmative Action hiring. This is
reflected in the difference-in-differences estimates in column (4), which indicate considerably smaller
educational shortfalls of women and minorities attributable to Affirmative Action hiring. The
differentials for white females and blacks are small and insignificant, while only those for Hispanics
(especially men) remain large and significant.
In Panel B we present the same types of estimates, but including controls for occupation and
job requirements in equation(1). We know from Tables 1 and 2 that the apparent effects of
Affirmative Action in shifting the demographic composition of recent hires is weaker within than
across occupations; it therefore may be more appropriate to look at relative educational attainment of
newly hired workers within our broadly-defined occupations, and controlling for job requirements.
At some level, the relevant policy question concerns the relative skills of individuals hired to do the
same job; if minorities and females hired under Affirmative Action are matched to jobs that are
appropriate for their skill levels, the within-job estimates might be most appropriate. On the other
hand, occupation and job requirements likely reflect the characteristics of the worker hired as well as
the job, in which case we may be over-controlling by including them as independent variables; that is,
“This evidence is broadly consistent with lower education and higher dropout rates of Hispanics (Hauser and Phang,
1993).
17Affirmative Action may lead to the hiring of less-skilled women or minorities who are then allocated
to less-demanding jobs. As a consequence, firms using Affirmative Action may have created more
unskilled job slots than they would have in the absence of these policies, thus lowering the overall
skill level of their workforce. Given these ambiguities regarding the choice of specification, we think
it best to present both types of evidence.
The qualitative conclusions in Panel B are very similar to those in Panel A. The only notable
difference is that the education differentials between women or minority workers hired by firms using
Affirmative Action and other workers are smaller, especially for Hispanic males, both in the simple
differences and the difference-in-differences estimates. The decline in the magnitude of the shortfall
for Hispanic males hired by firms using Affirmative Action when we control for job requirements
suggests that to some extent they are allocated to jobs which require less education.
Given the results in Table 2 indicating that hiring of Hispanics is not boosted by Affirmative
Action, it is perhaps a bit difficult to interpret the lower qualifications of Hispanics as resulting from
Affirmative Action hiring. However, the Table 2 results are based on cross-sectional data, rather than
panel data, so it is possible that those firms that use Affirmative Action would have othe~ise hired
even fewer Hispanics. To shed some additional light on this question, we analyzed data on the
percentage of applicants at the firm accounted for by each demographic group, as reported by the
respondent. These reveal that, in firms using Affirmative Action, the percentage of applications from
blacks is higher (by roughly two percentage points each) than in firms not using Affirmative Action,
while this percentage is lower for Hispanics (by 0.8 percentage points) .37 Given their higher overall
skill needs and lower application rates from this group, firms that use Affirmative Action may have to
J7The lower percentage of applicants from Hispanics in these firms is not significantly different from zero, but it is
significantly different from the fraction of blacks applying.
18be less selective in hiring Hispanic applicants.3g
An alternative approach to the issue of educational qualifications is to ask whether minorities
or women hired under Affirmative Action are less qualifled relative to the educational requirements
of the job, rather than simply relative to white males. We refer to this outcome as indicating that the
employee is “underqualified,” rather than “less qualified. ” For example, if Hispanics are sufficiently
qualified for the jobs they hold, while white males are either overqualified or allocated to more
demanding jobs, then the criticism of Affirmative Action on the grounds of lower educational levels
of Hispanics (as in Table 4) would be blunted. Conversely, while we find no evidence suggesting
that white women or blacks hired under Affirmative Action have relatively less education than white
males, they might be more underqualified relative to the jobs that they hold.
To examine this question, we use information on the educational requirement for the job
reported by the employer, and estimate logit models for whether the individual hired had less than the
reported required amount of education. There is some ambiguity in the coding of this dependent
variable, since employers were asked whether a college degree was required, without speci~ing
whether this was an Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree. We assume that they were referring to the
latter.39
The results are reported in Table 5; the control variables are the same as in Table 4. In
column (1) in Panel A, the positive signs of the estimates indicate that for all groups, women or
minorities hired under Affirmative Action are relatively more likely to be underqualified than white
males hired into firms using Affirmative Action. However, the estimated coefficients are significant
‘gOne reason for the lower application rate of Hispanics at firms using Affirmative Action might be that Hispanic
immigrants are more likely to work in smaller establishments that are owned or operated by co-ethnics, especially in Los
Angeles,
g9There are Vev few cases in the sample of workers being hired into jobs requiring college degrees that did not have at
least an Associate’s degree.
19only for black females (at the five-percent level) and Hispanic females (at the ten-percent level). In
column (3), we find a significant y higher probability that black males hired under Affirmative Action
are more likely to be underqualified, relative to white males in firms not using Affirmative Action.
However, in this table the column (2) estimates also indicate that some groups of women or
minorities hired under Affirmative Action are underqualified relative to comparable workers in firms
not using Affirmative Action. As a result, the difference-in-differences estimates are quite similar to
those in the other columns, although now the only significant evidence of underqualification of
women or minorities hired under Affirmative Action is for black females. Panel B, where we add the
occupation and job controls, leads to similar conclusions.40
Other Measures of Qualifications
In addition to looking at educational qualifications, we can use the data on non-educational
job requirements of recent hires to assess firther whether minorities or women hired under
Affirmative Action are less qualified. Although these data refer to the job and not the worker, they
may contain some information on worker qualifications, although they may tell us more about the
skill requirements of jobs to which various groups of workers have been matched than about skill
differences among workers within jobs.
As Table 1 indicates, we have data on seven job requirements, To provide a summary
measure, we construct the dependent variable used in Table 6 simply as the number of requirements
of the job held by the recent hire. The estimates in column (1) indicate significant shortfalls of black
and Hispanic males hired in firms using Affirmative Action relative to white males in similar firms.
However, these shortfalls also exist – although they are somewhat smaller – relative to white males
““Because this specification looks at education relative to educational requirements, it is not surprising that control Iing
for other job characteristics has little influence on the estimates.
20hired into firms not using Affirmative Action, as shown in column (3), but do not appear in
comparing women and minorities in the Affirmative Action and non-Affirmative Action sectors, as
shown in column (2). On net, therefore, the difference-in-differences estimates for black and
Hispanic males reveal much smaller differentials attributable to Affirmative Action, significant only
for Hispanic males. In addition, the difference-in-differences estimates indicate that Hispanic women
hired in firms using Affirmative Action are in jobs with relatively more requirements, indicating that
Hispanic women may possess other skills or qualifications that offset their lower educational
qualifications. In Panel B, when occupation controls are added, the differentials for black and
Hispanic men are reduced, with the difference-in-differences estimate no longer significant for the
latter group. Of course this may just reflect the fact that much of the variation in job requirements
occurs across rather than within occupations.
Job-Related Outcomes
The results in the preceding sections provide some evidence of relatively lower educational or
skill qualifications of blacks and Hispanics hired under Affirmative Action. But there remains the
question of whether the shortfalls in these two observable measures of qualifications imply inferior
performance on the job. If they do not, then there is perhaps no reason to be concerned with the
apparent lower qualifications of minorities hired under Affirmative Action.41
Consequently, in this subsection we look at three employment outcomes that should be related
to actual job performance: starting wages, current wages, and promotions. Looking at this broader set
of job-related outcomes is usefil for another important reason – namely, educational levels and job
requirements are only a subset of the many dimensions along which a worker’s qualifications can be
41Asan example, Bloch (1994) discusses James v. Stockharn Valves and Fittings Company, in which an employer
claimed that formal education requirements for manual laborers led to hiring of more whites than blacks. But the court
ruled that education was unrelated to job performance.
21measured. Measures such as wages and promotions should, if they are related to productivity,
provide more of a summary or “sufficient” statistic for a worker’s qualifications. A potential
objection, however, is that the same pressures that may lead to the hiring of less-qualified workers
under Affirmative Action may also lead employers to pay and promote women and minorities at a
rate that is more than commensurate with their productivity, in which case wages and promotions
would not be useful as measures of their relative job performance .42
To obtain a more independent measure of worker performance in these jobs, we use a rating
of the worker’s job performance (measured on a scale of one to 100) elicited from the person
interviewed 43 The survey also asked for the supervisor’s rating of the typical new hire into the job,
which lets us standardize across firms and jobs by looking at the deviation of the new hire’s
performance rating from the usual or typical rating. If the performance ratings were the product of a
formal evaluation procedure that is used to set wages and determine promotions, they might be
contaminated in the same way as data on wages and promotions (as employers might feel constrained
to manipulate performance ratings to backup their wage and promotion decisions). However, these
ratings are informal and unrelated to any actual pay and promotion decisions, and survey respondents
were promised fill confidentiality. Therefore, the ratings seem likely to provide an unbiased measure
of a worker’s true job performance.
However, even the standardized performance ratings are likely to be measured with
considerable error. If the measurement error is random with respect to true performance and the
independent variables, it should lead to larger standard errors on the estimated coefficients.
dZThewage and Pr~m~ti~n results might still be Of some interest, since there is virtually no empirical evidence to ‘ate
on the relationship of Affirmative Action to these outcomes.
43Asimilar variable is used in the EOPP Survey (e.g., Barron, et al., 1989) and a more recent, similar survey of
members of the National Federation of Independent Businesses (Bishop, 1993).
22However, the estimated signs of these coefficients should not be biased. Thus, if we fail to find
negative effects of Affirmative Action on these ratings, it would be difficult to interpret such findings
as stemming solely from measurement error.
-
Regressions for logs of starting and current wages are reported in Panels A and B of Table 7.
In addition to the firm, occupation, and job requirement controls, we also add standard human capital
controls (education and age to both sets of equations, and tenure to the equation for current wages).q4
As a means of assessing the reliability of the data, it is worth noting that wage differentials between
women or minorities and white males in firms not using Affirmative Action, which can be calculated
from the estimates in column (3) minus the estimates in column (2), indicate significantly lower
wages paid to women and minorities, The estimated differentials are -.16 for white women, -.17 for
black men, -,25 for black women, -.31 for Hispanic men, and -.30 for Hispanic women.
Turning to the three alternative comparisons for women or minority workers in firms using
Affirmative Action, column (1) indicates that the wage differentials between these workers and white
males in similar firms are considerably smaller than the wage differentials in firms not using
Affirmative Action, noted above .45 In fact, for black men the wage differential is erased. Because the
wage differentials compared with white males in firms not using Affirmative Action are somewhat
larger, as reported in column (3), and the differences between women and minorities in the two types
of firms are small, as reported in column (2), the difference-in-differences estimates in column (4)
indicate that Affirmative Action raises the relative wages of women and minorities, although most
440ne might object that by controlling for differences in qualifications, we bias the results against finding poorer
performance, as measured by wages (or promotions), However, the results reported in Table 7 turned out to be
insensitive to the inclusion of these variables.
45 Leonard (1990) reports similar evidence indicating that relative wages of minority to white males are higher in cities
and industries with high proportions of employment in establishments subject to Affirmative Action.
23groups still earn less than comparable white males in firms using Affirmative Action; the increase is
substantial for black and Hispanic men, on the order of 20 percent.4G The results are quite similar for
starting and current wages, indicating no differences in wage growth.47
Promotions
Panel C of Table 7 reports logit estimates of equations for whether the newly hired worker
was promoted.48 The independent variables are the same as in the other panels, with the exception of
an additional specification including controls for whether the race or sex of the supervisor differed
from that of the worker. The results in column (1) suggest that the probability of promotion for
blacks and Hispanics hired in firms using Affirmative Action is higher than for white males in similar
firms, although the differential is statistically significant only for Hispanic females. The difference-
in-differences estimates in column (4) convey the same result. Finally, again subtracting the
estimates in column (2) from those in column (3), we see that in firms not using Affirmative Action,
promotion probabilities are lower for each of the five groups of minorities or women. However, in
contrast to wages, the estimates suggest that the negative promotion differentials for Hispanics and
blacks in these firms is reversed in firms using Affirmative Action. This is so despite the earlier
evidence that blacks and Hispanics are relatively less qualified in terms of educational attainment.
dbTab]e I indicates that the percentage of the workforce covered by collective bargaining is higher in fl~s using
Affirmative Action. However, the relatively higher wages paid to women and minorities in such firms do not appear to
be attributable to the well-documented tendency for race and sex differentials in wages to be lower among union workers.
We reestimated the models adding a set of interactions between the demographic dummy variables D and two alternative
measures of unionization: the percentage covered by collective bargaining; and a dummy if this percentage was greater
than zero. The relatively higher wages paid to women or minorities in firms using Affirmative Action, based on the
difference-in-differences estimates, did not diminish in this augmented specification. In fact, in these data the effects of
unions appear to be reversed, with the signs of the estimated coefficients of the demographic dummy variable-union
interactions negative (although generally not significant). Part of the problem may be that we do not know the union
status of the specific recent hire to whom the data refer.
47This was confirmed by estimating similar regressions for the change between the starting and current wage. None of
the estimated coefficients of the Affirmative Action-demographic group interactions were statistically significant.
48Al~itation of the promotions variable is that median tenure with the employer is roughly two to three months in ‘Ur
sample. The proportion of workers promoted is only .08.
24Performance Ratin~s
Given our uncertainty over whether the wage and promotion results reflect better performance
of blacks and Hispanics, or preferential treatment, we turn in Table 8 to the performance rating
regressions, in which the dependent variable is the measured rating minus the typical rating. We
report results including only the firm (and city and year) controls in Panel A, and adding in the
occupation, job requirement, and other controls in Panel B. The estimates in column (1) indicate that
black females hired under Affirmative Action obtain higher performance ratings than white males
hired in similar firms, with the differential significant at the ten-percent level, The evidence for white
females, black males, and Hispanic females also indicates that their performance is not lower than
that of white males in similar firms. On the other hand, the performance ratings of Hispanic males at
these firms are significantly lower.
The estimates in column (3) suggest that the differentials between each group of women or
minorities and white males in firms that do not use Affirmative Action are similar to the differentials
in firms that use Affirmative Action, But the estimates in column (2) also indicate that similar
differentials exist between these groups of women or minorities hired at the two types of firms. As a
result, the difference-in-differences estimates in column (4) are quite similar to those in column(1);
the only difference is that the relative performance of black females hired in firms using Affirmative
Action is now more strongly positive.
extensive set of controls is added.49’50
The evidence is very similar in Panel B, when the more
4gIfuse of Affirmative Action in hiring is not exogenous, it is possible that the relatively positive ratings given to
blacks in firms using Affirmative Action might reflect relatively favorable views of minorities at firms that have chosen
to use Affirmative Action. But it is unclear why this would be true for many groups but not Hispanic males. Our
controls for the racial composition of customers and for the race/gender of the respondent should also help to control for
such factors. We also note that our job requirement controls include information on customer contact, where immigrant
Hispanics or Asians might be at some disadvantage relative to native-born whites and blacks.
J“The estimated Coefflclents of the demographic dummy variables (measuring perfO~anCe rating differentials in firms
not using Affirmative Action) were all statistically insignificant, although they were positive for all groups except white
25Thus, the evidence for Hispanics tells a relatively consistent story, especially for the men. We
generally find that Hispanic men and women hired under Affirmative Action are less qualified in
terms of education; and at least the men are matched to less-demanding jobs and get worse
performance ratings. 5] On the other hand, while we find some evidence that blacks are less qualified
in terms of education, we find no such evidence in their performance ratings, which (like their wage
and promotion rates) are relatively higher in these firms than elsewhere. And for white females, who
appear to be the primary beneficiaries of Affirmative Action (in terms of numbers of hires), we find
virtually no evidence of weaker (or stronger) qualifications or performance. 52’53
women. The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables for different race or sex of the respondent or supervisor
indicated that supervisors or respondents of the opposite sex resulted in performance ratings that were significantly
higher, by about two points, whereas supervisors or respondents of the opposite race resulted in ratings that were lower
by about one to two points (significantly so for supervisors of the opposite race).
SIA1though Hispanics in this sample are heavily concentrated in Los Angeles (with 70 Percent of the new]y ‘ired
Hispanics being located there), the finding of low performance ratings for Hispanic men is not unique to Los Angeles; if
anything, the negative difference-in-differences estimates for Hispanic males in Los Angeles were somewhat smaller than
those in other cities,
52When we add these performance measures to the current wage equations in Table 7, we generally find that they
generate positive and significant effects on wages, But the various race/gender differentials presented there are little
changed by their inclusion. On one hand, this suggests that the relatively higher wages paid to women and minorities
hired under Affirmative Action may reflect preferential treatment. On the other hand, these results are based on using the
performance ratings as an independent variable; the presumed measurement error in these ratings inhibits our ability to
ask whether performance ratings explain these higher wages.
530ne potential problem with the standardized performance ratings is that when we look at a worker hired by a firm
using Affirmative Action, the typical rating that is subtracted off may also apply to an Affirmative Action hire, In this
case, the standardization may erase any relative differences in performance between Affirmative Action and non-
Affirmative Action hires, leading the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of Affirmative Action on
performance to be zero. To examine this possibility, were-estimated the equations in Table 8 using the raw performance
ratings. The column (4) estimates using the raw ratings were not generally further from zero than the corresponding
estimates in Table 8, suggesting that standardization does not force the estimated effects of Affirmative Action to be zero.
In fact, the only substantive change was that the relative performance shortfall of Hispanic men was erased. This
occurred because the estimated difference with respect to Hispanic males in firms not using Affirmative Action fell to
zero, in contrast to an estimated difference of-5,94 in Table 8; this indicates that the typical rating of jobs into which
Hispanic males are hired is substantially higher in Affirmative Action firms, which is a reason to standardize the
performance ratings, and stands in contrast to the potential problem that typical ratings in firms using Affirmative Action
are biased towards the ratings of the Affirmative Action hire to whom the data refer, thus obscuring lower ratings of such
hires.
26Disa~~re~ated Results
Theabove results address average effects foreach of thedemographic groups considered. But
these averages might mask differences across subgroups within the broader category. In particular,
we disaggregate the data set by establishment size, based on the claim by some researchers that
Affirmative Action has different effects at large and small establishments (e.g., Bloch, 1994).
Affirmative Action effects may differ in large and small establishments because establishments of
different sizes use different methods to implement the policy, or because they face different costs of
compliance or non-compliance. Table 9 therefore present results for performance ratings, as well as
the hiring shifis associated with Affirmative Action, breaking down the results for establishments
with less than (or equal to) 100 and more than 100 workers.
The estimates in column (1) parallel the multinominal logit estimates in column (2’) of Table 2
of the association of Affirmative Action hiring with the demographic group of the worker hired. In
Panel A, which looks at small establishments, the results largely parallel those in Table 2, as the only
significant associations are a higher likelihood that a white female or black male is hired. In Panel B,
in contrast, which looks at large establishments, the largest effects appear to be negative associations
with the likelihood of hiring black females or Hispanics.
To some extent, this reflects the tendency of large firms to hire minorities (especially blacks)
in large numbers regardless of their use of Affirmative Action (Holzer, 1996b). There are also some
differences in observable characteristics between large firms that use Affirmative Action and those
that do not. In particular, large establishments using Affirmative Action are more likely to be in the
service sector, while those not using Affirmative Action have a greater tendency to be in wholesale
and retail trade and to be located in central cities. In addition, application rates from blacks and
Hispanics are relatively higher in firms not using Affirmative Action. Thus, it does not appear that
27Affirmative Action boosts the hiring of women or minorities relatively more in large than in small
establishments; in fact, the opposite may even be the case, as the estimated effect of Affirmative
Action on the probability that a white male is hired is actually positive in large estab1ishments.54
The results for performance ratings, in columns (2)-(5), are quite striking, In particular, the
difference-in-differences estimates provide some evidence that in large establishments (over 100
workers) women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action receive lower performance ratings
than white men hired into similar firms, with the differentials significant for white females, black
males, and Hispanic males (for whom the effect is quite large, equal to about one standard deviation
of the standardized performance rating) .55
However, note that the lower relative performance ratings of women and minorities in large
establishments using Affirmative Action do not appear in any of the simple differences (with the
exception of Hispanic males in column (3)); in fact, most are positive, and with the exception of
Hispanic males, all are small. This occurs because the relative differences stem from the lower
ratings for white males in non-Affimative Action firms (column (3)), rather than lower ratings for
women and minorities in firms using Affirmative Action (column (1)).56
54This qualitative result did not changeif we included measures of the percentage of applicants in each demographic
group, for the subsample and for the subset of demographic groups (black males, black females, and Hispanics) for whom
these measures are available. However, these data on applicants are probabIy very noisy, because they are firm-wide, and
do not refer specifically to the job in which the recent hire occurred.
SsSince the survey respondent was identified as the person who had hired the last worker, it is likely to be the owner or
manager in small- and medium-sized companies; this person should also be able to speak knowledgeably about a
worker’s job performance. In large companies, these functions are more likely to be separated, perhaps suggesting more
error in the performance measures for these observations. However, at least insofar as the measurement error is random,
this cannot explain the large differentials in establishments employing more than 100 workers.
SGThisfinding speaks to a potential source of bias in the estimation of equation (1) when we look at Performance
ratings. If firms that adopt Affirmative Action by choice tend to be those that are favorably disposed towards women or
minorities, we might expect higher ratings of women or minorities in such firms, leading to a positive correlation between
the error term and the D“AA interactions. We would expect this problem to be more severe in small establishments,
where the use of Affirmative Action is more likely to be voluntary. Although this source of bias would lead us to expect
larger recorded performance shortfalls for women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action in large establishments,
we would expect this to act through higher ratings for women or minorities in small establishments using Affirmative
28In addition, we emphasize that recent hires into these large establishments represent less than
one-third of the total sample, and for most demographic groups the results are reversed in small
establishments, although the differentials are smaller.57 Thus, for most women and minorities, job
performance relative to white males is roughly the same whether or not Affirmative Action is used in
hiring.
V. Conclusion
We use micro-level data on employers and employees to investigate whether minority or
female employees hired under Affirmative Action procedures are less qualified, relative to other
groups of workers. Our measures of qualifications include educational attaimnent of the workers
hired (in absolute levels and relative to job requirements), skill requirements on the job, and a variety
of outcome measures that presumably are linked to worker performance on the job. The analysis is
based on data from a new survey of over 3,200 employers in four major metropolitan areas in the
Us.
On average, we find some evidence that minority employees hired under Affirmative Action
have lower educational attainment, and are somewhat more likely to fall short of formal educational
“requirements” on these jobs when they are hired, although we find no such evidence for white
females hired under Affirmative Action. However, for blacks, at least, the shortfalls in education of
workers hired at firms using Affirmative Action are not much larger than those at firms not using
Affirmative Action.
Action, rather than through lower ratings for white males in large establishments not using Affirmative Action, as we find
here. Thus, it appears that we have to consider other explanations of the differences in results by size of establishment.
“If we make the sample of large establishments bigger by choosing a smaller size cut-off (such as 50), the negative
performance differentials fall and become insignificant for all groups except Hispanic males.
29We speculate that the perception that Affirmative Action leads to preferential treatment of
women and minorities is based on a simple comparison of these groups with white males in firms
using Affirmative Action, In these firms, it is not inaccurate for critics of Affirmative Action to
assert that women or minorities are less qualified (in terms of education) than white males. However,
the difference-in-differences analysis suggests that this shortfall to some extent reflects an economy-
wide shortfall in educational attainment among minorities. That is, the gap in qualifications in the
firms or sector using Affirmative Action does not necessarily imply that Affirmative Action is
responsible for the gap; our evidence suggests that, to a large extent, it is not.
When we consider measures of outcomes for workers in these jobs, we find that minorities
and females hired under Affirmative Action do relatively well. On average, their wages are relatively
higher, as are their probabilities of promotion. But since these outcomes might themselves be driven
by Affirmative Action policies, and not just by the performance of the workers, we also consider
employers’ ratings of employee performance as an additional outcome measure. These measures are
subjective, and comparisons across employers and jobs are likely to be plagued by considerable noise
and by the lack of a uniform standard; we therefore adjust the ratings for the employer’s rating of the
“typical” worker in the same job, The results show that ratings of white female or black employees in
firms using Affirmative Action are generally at least as high as those of other comparable workers.
These results are reversed only for Hispanic men, who receive significantly lower performance
ratings (although this finding must be tempered by the fact that Affirmative Action does not appear to
boost the hiring of Hispanic men in this sample).
Taken together, the results of this paper suggest that critics of Affirmative Action maybe
right in pointing to some shortfalls in qualifications among women or minorities hired under
Affirmative Action. However, these critics may be focusing too narrowly on one or two easily-
30observable measures of qualifications that are not the only predictors of what is ultimately the most
important measure – job performance. Our results suggest that most women or minorities hired under
Affirmative Action make up in some way – presumably through qualifications or skills other than
those measures we observe – for the educational shortfalls in qualifications that we find. Thus, there
may be some redistribution of employment away from white males towards minorities and females at
firms using Affirmative Action, but there does not appear to be substitution of less-able women or
minority workers for more-able white male workers.
When we disaggregate our sample by establishment size, we find some evidence that in large
establishments (over 100 workers) women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action are
relatively less qualified and receive lower performance ratings than white men hired into similar
firms. However, we do not attach too much importance to these results for a number of reasons:
recent hires into these large establishments represent less than one-third of the total sample; for most
demographic groups the results are reversed in small establishments (although the differentials are
smaller); the relatively larger gap between women or minorities and white males in firms using
Affirmative Action is driven by lower ratings of the latter in non-Affirmative Action firms, rather
than lower ratings of the former in Affirmative Action firms; and, Affirmative Action does not appear
to boost hiring of women or minorities in the large establishments in our data set.
Therefore, we interpret the overall evidence as indicating that most groups of women and
minorities hired under Affirmative Action perform their jobs roughly as well relative to white males
as do those hired in)rms that do not use Affirmative Action. The average effects indicated by the full
sample results – which arguably are most relevant to evaluating the effects of the policy – support the
conclusion that there is essentially no performance shortfall among most groups of women and
minorities hired under Affirmative Action.
31This does not necessarily imply that there are no costs to the use of Affirmative Action. One
possibility is that these firms hire relatively more less-skilled workers than they would in the absence
of Affirmative Action, which might entail some cost in efficiency. Another is that the same number
of less-skilled workers are hired as before, but that there is relatively more redistribution of
employment away from less-skilled white males within these firms. Without panel data on firms both
before and afier their use of these procedures, it is impossible to distinguish among these
interpretations.
We should also note a number of further caveats with respect to these findings. Given the
data that we have, we are only able to estimate the effects of Affirmative Action on the last worker
hired in each firm, which is not necessarily a representative sample of all employees hired under these
procedures. We are also not able to compare different hires into comparable jobs within each firm.
The focus on recent hires also forces us to consider only short-term outcomes for a sample of
employees with very low job tenure. Finally, our self-reported measure of use of Affirmative Action
may not allow us to define the relevant set of firms or activities as clearly as in those studies that use
more objective measures, such as federal contractor status (although we have argued that our measure
appears to mimic more objective measures quite well, and could conceivably be preferable).
Despite these caveats, we believe that our data provide usefil information on the effects of
Affirmative Action, by providing the first micro-level evidence linking Affirmative Action to worker
qualifications and performance. We interpret the data as indicating that, for the most part,
Affirmative Action does not lead to the hiring of minorities or women with substantially lower
qualifications or weaker job performance.
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covered by collective bmgaining
Percentage of customers black























































Respondent and scrciervisor characteristics:
Respondent’ssex different from worker’ssex
Respondent’srace different from worker’srace
Supervisor’ssex different from worker’ssex













There are 10390bservations incolumns (l)and(2), aod 1481observations in columns (3) and(4). Standrrrderrors ofmeans arereported inpmentheses. There are
fewer observations for age, education, percentage of customers in each race group, andthe demographic characteristics of the supervisor and respondent, because of
missing data. Inthefollowing tables, adummyvaiable formissiog dataonthese vaiables isincluded, andthevwiables meset to zero,Table 2: Logit and MultinominalLogit Estimates of Effect of





























































Estimated Iogit coefficients of dummy variable for Affirmative
Action hire are reported in columns(1) and (1‘),and multinominal
coefficients in columns (2) and (2’). Estimates are reported relative
to the omitted (white male) category. There are 2520 observations.
All specifications include dummy variables for city and year and firm
controls. Asiarr male and female hires are also included as outcomes,
but results are not reported, In columns (1) and (2), “minority” refers
to blacks and Hispanics. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are
reported in parentheses. Marginal effects on probability of outcome
evaluated at weighted sample means are reported in square brackets,
Estimates me weighted,Table 3: Alternative Estimators of Differentials in Qualifications or Performance
Associated with Affirmative Action
Equation:
Qijk = awijk ‘(l – AAjk) + ~Dijk-AAJk + Y~ijk-AAjk + ~Dijk”( 1 – AAjk) + Oxj + lZJ + ‘ijk
Simule Differences:
~ - y= woman/minority AAhirevs, white male AAhire
~ -6=womatiminority AAhirevs, woman.lminority non-AA hire
~ - a=woman/minority AAhirevs. white malenon-AA hire
Difference-in-differences:
(P-y) -(6- ~)=(P-b) -(y-a)=
(woman/minority AA hire vs. white male AA hire) - (woman/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire)
— —












A, Firm Controls Only
Difference relative to:
Same demo.
White male group White male












































(,24) (.27) (.23) (.30)
There are 2388 observations, Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications include dummy
variables for city and year and firm controls, as well as dummy variables and interactions for Asian males
and females. In Panel B educational requirements are not included. There are fewer observations than in the
previous tables because of missing data on the recent hire’s actual schooling, The educational variable is
coded as follows: drop out (10 years); GED (1 1 years); high school graduate (12 years); trade school or some
college (13 years); AA degree (14 years); Bachelor’s degree (16 years); some graduate school (17 years); and
graduate degree (18 years). Estimates are weighted. The difference-in-differences estimates in column (4)
correspond to either of the following two equivalent relative comparisons: (woman/minority AA hire vs.
white male AA hire) – (woman/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire); or (woman/minority
AA hire vs. woman/minority non-AA hire) – (white male AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire). A relevant
differences-in-differences estimate with respect to the estimates in column (3) is (woman/minority AA hire
vs. white male non-AA hire) – (woman/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire). This estimate













A. Firm Controls Only
Difference relative to:
Same demo,
White male group White male


































































There are 2073 observations in Panel A, and 2063 in Panel B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
and partial derivatives evaluated at weighted sample means in square brackets. All specifications include
dummy variables for city and year and firm controls, as well as dummy variables and interactions for Asian
males and females. The dependent variable is coded as one if the job requires a college degree and the hire
has less than a college degree, or the job requires a high school degree and the hire has less than a high
school degree (including a GED). We assume that a required college degree refers to a Bachelor’s degree. In
Panel B the educational requirements are not included, The sample is smaller than in the previous table
because data on the education requirement for the job is needed. The number of observations varies with the
number of independent variables (or combinations thereofl which serve as perfect predictors of the





















































































There are 2520 observations, Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and partial derivatives evaluated at
weighted sample means in square brackets. City and year dummy variables and firm controls, as well as
dummy variables and interactions for Asian males and females. Estimates are weighted, See footnotes to

































































































































































There are2141 obsemations in Panels Aand B,md2445in Pmel C. Standard errors arereported inparentheses, and
patiial derivatives evaluated atweighted sample means insqume brackets. Allspecitications include dummy
variables for city and year and firm, occupation, andjob requirement controls. Inaddition, controls foreducation, age,
tenure (in all but the starting wage regression), and dummyvariables for different race or sex of respondent or supervisor
are included. Estimates are weighted. See footnotes to Table 3foradditionaI details.Table 8: OLS Estimates of (Performance Rating – Typical Rating for Job) Regressions
A. Firm Controls Only
Difference relative to:
Same demo,
White male group White male Difference-in-
AA hire non-AA hire non-AA hire differences
AA hire: (1) (2) (3) (4)
White female -1.24 .01 -1.27 .03
(1.52) (1,17) (1,20) (1,91)
Black male .98 2,72 .95 2,74
(2.26) (2,42) (2.08) (2,85)
Black female 3,96 5,76 3.93 5,78
(2.41) (2,56) (2.25) (2,96)
Hispanic male -6.36 -5.94 -6.38 -5,91
(2.35) (2.41) (2,19) (2,84)
Hispanic female -3.00 .71 -3,02 ,73
(2.59) (2,91) (2.45) (3,27)
B. Occupation. Job Requirement. Education. Age. Tenure. and Different
Race or Sex of Respondent or Supervisor Controls Added
White female -1.94 -.51 -1,94 -.50
(1,57) (1,19) (1,29) (1.92)
Black male 3.60 1.65 3,60 1.65
(2.47) (2.43) (2,33) (2.86)
Black female 6.06 5.02 6,06 5.02
(2.63) (2.55) (2,51) (2,96)
Hispanic male -2.54 -5.94 -2,54 -5.94
(2,67) (2.42) (2,55) (2.85)
Hispanic female -,56 -.80 -,57 -.80
(2.88) (2,92) (2,78) (3,27)
There are 2134 observations, Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications include dummy
variables for city and year and firm, occupation, andjob requirement controls, Estimates are weighted. See



































A, < 100 Workers
(Performance Rating – TyDica] Rating for Job)
Difference relative to:
Same demo.
White male, group, White male,



































































Estimates in column (1) correspond to those in column (2’) of Table 2. Estimates in columns (2)-(5) correspond to those in Panel
B of Table 7. In Panel A, there are 1643 observations in column (l), and 1476 in columns (2)-(5), The corresponding sample
sizes for Panel B are 876 and 658, See footnotes to Tables 2, 3 and 7 for more details.